Thursday 20 October 2016


Hun Sen Targets Diaspora Markets



“…Why Cambodia is bothered too much by its diaspora market? … The diaspora is a tiny market for votes, a relatively small market for financing the opposition, and a sunset market. I'm unsighted as to why the fight over that market is so serious by CPP.” 

Centre for Policy Studies Director Chan Sophal, 10 October 2016, Campro [professional network]


“If Sam Rainsy came to be with me, it would be better than me being alone. But if he does not decide to come back, we can still run the party without him.”

CNRP Acting president Kem Sokha, 12 October 2016, The Phnom Penh Post


“So please, your majesty with your soul resting in peace, use your power to lift up Khmer politicians to unite the nation again and find reconciliation for all Khmers to be happy.”

CNRP Acting president Kem Sokha, 17 October 2016, The Cambodia Daily



Economist Chan Sophal asks the very pertinent question. Hun Sen for the last few years has sent his eldest son into what Chan Sophal calls diaspora “market”.  He says he refers to it as market because there is a competition.

Anyway, Chan Sophal is perplexed by the logic of Hun Sen’s venture into the markets. He argues the markets, which have so far largely funded Hun Sen’s opponents in Cambodia, are a dying breed; they will disappear within 10-20 years by natural causes. He says, compared with the CPP’s financial muscles, the diaspora political contributions to CNRP are pittances. Thus, he contends there is no need to compete in these “sunset” markets. They do not even vote.

Nevertheless, Chan Sophal may misread Hun Sen’s diaspora policy. While he is thinking of competitive markets where fairness rules, autocrat Hun Sen eyes a monopoly. Chan Sophal may not know Hun Sen is a control freak who wants all monopolistic power both in politics and the markets.

Inside Cambodia, Hun Sen’s strong-arm tactics have paid off; they have instilled fear in the people, especially among his opponents and critics. Only brave loudmouths are those who justify, or find excuses for, whatever Hun Sen can come up with. In their mind, the silent majority is simply stupid, ready to swallow anything.

Amid the subdued is a timid CNRP. Hun Sen’s intimidation makes their head spin. Scores of their MPs and senators are in exile or jail, or on their way there. The deputy president has been holed up in their headquarters, longing for a return from exile of the president who maintains he has higher priorities. They beg the king for pardons eventhough they insist they have done nothing wrong or illegal, only to be rejected by Hun Sen, who overshadows the king. The deputy president is so despondent he prays for late Sihanouk’s help.

Now that he has the domestic market in his pocket, Hun Sen turns his focus onto the diaspora for a complete monopoly in Cambodian politics. Autocratic Hun Sen may be too impatient to tolerate the Chan Sophal sunset markets. Autocrats usually want everything yesterday.

There are, however, some splinters Hun Sen must remove from his skin. First, the threat and fear he has so successfully instilled in the local psyche may not be effective in the diaspora communities. Any violence that openly works in Cambodia may not be so easily executed and covered up where impunity is not an option. Second, while the domestic media largely dance to Hun Sen’s tunes, the rest of the world does not. Hun Sen must shut down these international media to prevent uncovering any unsavoury information he claims to be falsified.

However, a glimpse of hope is that if the diaspora communities are seen as markets, where money is usually exchanged for goods and services, Hun Sen still has an option of buying the monopoly with his monies.

The question is then whether the diaspora communities will sell out their soul. Will you?


Ung Bun Ang
20x16 



By The Way


«គណៈកម្មការ​នៅ​ជំហរ​ដដែល ព្រោះ​ថា​​នេះ​ជា​ទី​វត្តអារាម​ដែល​យើង​ត្រូវ​ធ្វើ​បុណ្យ ហើយ​ព្រះចៅ​អធិការ​ក៏​បាន​ឯកភាព​ហើយ។ អ៊ីចឹង​យើង​បាន​ប្រកាស​ហើយ នេះ​ជា​ជំហរ​គណៈកម្មការ។ គណៈកម្មការ​ជូន​ដំណឹង​ទៅ​សាលា​ក្រុង​ មិន​មែន​សុំ​ការ​អនុញ្ញាត​ពី​សាលាក្រុង​ទេ ប៉ុន្តែ​សាលាក្រុង​បែរ​ជា​ចេញ​លិខិត​បដិសេធ។ និយាយ​រួម​គឺ​នៅ​តែ​វត្ត​ចាស់ ដដែល យើង​ជូន​ដំណឹង​ដោយសារ​​ព្រះចៅ​អធិការ​លោក​អនុញ្ញាត»

សមាជិក​គណៈកម្មការ​បុណ្យ លោក សៅ កុសល ​ថ្ងៃ​ទី ៧ ខែ តុលា ឆ្នាំ​២០១៦ វិទ្យុ​អាស៊ីសេរី 


If the timid CNRP ever needed lessons in overcoming the CPP threats, the experience of the committee organising the 100-day commemoration for Kem Ley might offer some clue. The committee understands Hun Sen’s thinking far better than the CNRP does. When Hun Sen refuses permission for them to hold the commemoration at Wat Chas, the committee makes it so blunt to him that his objection will not stop them from proceeding. Then Hun Sen backs down.

Why does the committee decide to defy Hun Sen? They must know Kem Ley commands so much respect from so many people that it will be extremely difficult for Hun Sen to go against the people’s power. They are right.

Why does Hun Sen back down? Definitely not for the love of, or respect for, Kem Ley. He must be fearful of the people’s power that Kem Ley still commands. His armed forces would not have enough time and bullets to shoot them all. He is also right to back down in this instance. Nevertheless, he must be now working to silence the committee members one-by-one later, either through jail or assassination. His adversaries seem to be ready, anyhow.

Still, the CNRP leadership may appreciate the audacity of the organising committee only after first acquiring some backbone.



Nota Bene - It is regrettable I may be duped into using in the last Pseng- Pseng edition the photo of the Cambodia’s strong couple standing with troops reviewed by Vietnam prime minister. I assumed the photo was legit after it had been floated in the cyber space for a few years and the CPP had not bothered to shoot it down, or search and jail the photo doctor.




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Monday 10 October 2016

Hun Sen Serves Two Masters Well



តើវៀតណាមជាឪពុកខ្ញុំ ឬជាមហាក្សត្រខ្ញុំឬ? វៀតណាមមិនមែនជាចៅហ្វាយរបស់ខ្ញុំ ដែលខ្ញុំត្រូវស្មោះត្រង់នោះទេ។
លោក​នាយក​រដ្ឋ​មន្ត្រី​ហ៊ុន សែន ថ្ងៃ​ទី ១ កក្កដា ២០១៦ ហ៊ុន សែន ​ហ្វេស​ប៊ុក

“Is Vietnam my father or my King?... Vietnam is not my master to whom I must be loyal.”

Prime Minister Hun Sen, 31 July 2016, Hun Sen Facebook


“In his meeting with Son Minh Thang, Deputy Head of the Steering Committee [for the Southwest Region], General [Dieng] Sarun [Deputy Commander of the Army, Deputy Commander of the Prime Minister's Bodyguard Unit] briefed the host on the political situation in Cambodia….”

Cambodia, Vietnam seek more cooperation, 16 June 2016, Vietnam Net


“[Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister] Mr. Don added that Vietnam supported all of Cambodia’s major activities, especially the upcoming 2017 and 2018 elections, and would always be there to help.”

Khmer Times reporter San Bunsim, 7 October 2016, Khmer Times


“Article 3 … His Majesty Preah Bat Samdech Preah Boromneath Norodom Sihamoni and other leaders of Cambodia expressed their deep gratitude for the strong support and assistance that generations of leaders and people of Vietnam accorded to the people of Cambodia in the past and at present, and affirmed that they always remember the assistance of the Vietnamese voluntary soldiers in cooperation with Cambodian people to liberate Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge genocide regime in 1979.”

Joint statement on the 1516 June State visit of President Tran Dai Quang to Cambodia, 16 June 2016, Vietnam Net Bridge




The answer to Hun Sen's questions is: No, Vietnam is neither his father nor his King. It might be, but it is not. Nevertheless, a more interesting question is, is he right to claim Vietnam is not his master?

Maybe; but he certainly treats Vietnam like one, and it behaves like one too.

First, there is a role for Vietnam in Cambodian internal politics. For instance, Dieng Sarun briefs his Vietnamese host about Cambodian political situations. Tran Don declares Vietnam supports and is ready to assist all Cambodian major activities including the forth coming local elections. Does Vietnam report to Hun Sen their internal affairs? Does Vietnam need Hun Sen to declare his support and assistance for its major activities? Unlikely.

Second, the Vietnamese role is more by design. Within the last four years, there have been at least five inter-State visits by Vietnam and nine by Cambodia – all led by top military and civilian officials including Hun Sen. Just in the last four months there are eight visits. Why must they be so consuming?

There are two recurring themes in those visits. First, it is to "deepen the defence cooperation” between the two nations. The deepened cooperation may well lend much credibility to reports of Vietnamese troop movements into Cambodia during border clashes with Thailand, and more recently, of a deployment of about 5,000 Vietnamese special forces into Cambodia to be ready to strike if the 2013 elections turbulence is getting out of Hun Sen’s hand.

The second is to express Cambodia’s gratitude to Vietnam. If Cambodia’s indispensable contributions towards the Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam war were counted for anything Hun Sen’s gratitude for the Vietnamese 1979 interventions could not be so much. Though, it keeps growing with the continuous deepening of the military cooperation.

Anyhow, Hun Sen’s firm stance against Vietnam’s interests in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes convinces many that Hun Sen has turned himself away from Vietnam – towards China. Has he?

It is inconceivable that, with the deepened military cooperation, Vietnam would let Hun Sen off the hook scot-free for damaging its SCS interests. He must be ready to pay anything to pacify Vietnam; Cambodia still has abundant natural resources including border land that Vietnam is drooling over.

While Hun Sen needs the Vietnamese deepened military cooperation, he also needs Chinese cash to grow, not necessarily the economy, business empires of his family and personal interest groups through corruption siphons. The cash that comes without any good governance conditions in exchange for Chinese control over Cambodia’s natural resources is more than enough to command Hun Sen’s loyalty.

Indeed, this is another Hun Sen’s win-win brilliance. The masters are thrilled with their tributes, his family and tycoons with their wealth, and local intellectuals with a continuous GDP growth. He does not have to choose between Vietnam and China; he can have both. After all, he is just one of Cambodian leaders who have perfected the art of serving multiple masters concurrently since the sixteenth century.


Ung Bun Ang
10x16



By The Way, A Postcard From Hanoi




Nguyen Tan Dung takes the honour of reviewing both his troops and his official guests Cambodia’s Strong Couple in Hanoi on 27 December 2013


With such a downtrodden Khmer courtesy greeting by the Cambodia’s Strong Couple looking for eye contact, the stern-face Vietnamese prime minister looks elsewhere, if not ignoring his official guests. How can he treat his official guests as if they represent a mere vassal state?

He seems to have received some sort of audacity boost during the Hanoi visit as a week later Hun Sen orders his armed forces to shoot into crowds of protesters on Veng Sreng Boulevard. Five are killed and more than twenty are injured in the name of law and order. Hanoi would be proud for the job well done.



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Wednesday 5 October 2016

Hun Sen's Jumbo 747 in the Sand


“People who use this data [UN Comtrade] seem unprofessional to me.”

Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) Acting Minister Tina Dith, 28 September 2016, The Phnom Penh Post

 

“A user has to be aware of its copyright disclaimer which states that the data is provided for internal use only and may not be re-disseminated in any form without the written permission of the United Nations Statistics Division. I believe there must be a reason to set such a policy and copyright…and I took care to not infringe on this copyright by re-disseminating any figures.”

MME Acting Minister Tina Dith, 28 September 2016, Khmer Times

 


“Your source of information [UN Comtrade], I do not trust it.”

Ministry of Commerce (MC) spokesman Soeng Sophary, 27 September 2016, The Phnom Penh Post


I believe in the "presumption d'innocence" until someone is proven guilty. I sound silly but with suspicion around, no one can work as a team. 

MME Acting Minister Tina Dith, 28 September 2016, Campro (an informal network of Cambodian professionals and intellectuals)


“Any competent authorithy want to check the previous export docs, it's always there for record [sic].”

MME Acting Minister Tina Dith, 4 October 2016, Campro


“I am not aware of any [corruption in sand dredging export]. We are all working hard to fight illegal mining, to harmonize the social cohesion between communities and mine concessionaires, to efficiently collect royalties, and develop our mining resources.”

MME Acting Minister Tina Dith, 28 September 2016, Khmer Times



So what is the CPP government up to with sand exports? Nothing really.

According to UN Comtrade, Cambodia exports 17.07m tonnes of sand to Singapore between 2007 and 2015. In the recipient ledger, however, the total shipment records more than 26 times to 72.70m tonnes. Suddenly, there is a whopping $747m variance that may or may not need investigating.

One strategy to denounce anything is to demolish the data credibility. Tina Dith argues the UN Comtrade numbers are unreliable and misleading, best suited only for unprofessional or politically motivated motives. He points to a general UN disclaimer, statement of limitations, and copyright issues. But they all are applicable to other UN publications. This could mean much UN information is not credible. The MC’s Soeng Sophary simply dismisses the UN Camtrade data all together.

Nevertheless, those unreliable UN Comtrade data must come from somewhere. Usually, they come from UN member governments who are obliged to supply them to international agencies, like UN, ADB, World Bank, IMF, etc… In this case, Soeng Sophary, who distrusts the UN Comtrade data, later produces MC documents that show its weights and dollar values are similar to the UN Comtrade data. Now the MC would appear to reject its own handiwork.

Another strategy is to argue a variance is typical. Tina Dith is right when pointing out variances between exporting numbers and recipient numbers within the UN Camtrade data base are normal. This is due to a number of factors including usual time lag between shipments leaving an exporting port and their arrival at the recipient port, unless they adopt an accrual accounting system. However, the variances at any cut-off point for any period are relatively immaterial, and can be easily reconciled in both the exporting and importing ledgers. But the variance of concern here is the jumbo $747m.

Still, Tina Dith demands the principle of presumed innocence before proven guilty from those who jump onto corruption. This principle would work if there were an investigation. But there is none.

The elephant of $747m in the room is irrelevant. Anti-corruption head Om Yentieng will not investigate unless there is a complaint. Taxation department’s Holl Thirith declines to comment on taxes collected from sand-dredging companies that are required to pay a 20 percent profit tax. MME minister Suy Sem early this year claims documentations on sand exports are securely kept with full accountability – without producing any documents. Tina Dith assures only competent authorities have access to them, pushing others into justifiable speculations. He also says the MME’s priority lies elsewhere, not the missing millions; it seems more beneficial to secure the stable door after the horse has bolted. Perhaps, a decisive factor for ignoring the elephant is that two of Hun Sen’s daughters are also involved in sand-dredging business, which is cited in the MC company register webpage before being removed in response to a Global Witness report on Hun family’s business empire.

It is the jumbo elephant of $747m in the room, buried in the sand.


Ung Bun Ang
04x16



By The Way

“[Choup Samlap] did not confess and was stubborn, because, from what I understand, our law cannot do anything to him unless we do it in a peaceful way [sic]. What I understand is, if we call in Comrade Duch, he would make a confession.”

Ministry of Interior spokesman Khieu Sopheak, 12 August 2016, The Phnom Penh Post


Is suspect Choup Samlap is really tough, or the authority is really weak? Or are they simply in the same boat with a mastermind?

The mastermind must be frustrated that the murder of Kem Ley was not cleanly executed, leaving Choup Samlap to remain a pain in the butt. When a crowd was chasing the suspect and arrested him, they had no idea what he had done. Had the mastermind planted a message in the crowd that he had just shot dead Kem Ley, the mob would have killed the suspect there and then. There would be no pressure on the authority or the mastermind to think of Comrade Duch, and to go through a whole charade of investigation and prosecution.



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