Hun Sen Brings Back the Smile

“We must solve this problem; we cannot let failed students miss the opportunity. Therefore, in accordance with the ministry’s preparation, I think there will be a second exam within one or one and half month – and I support this second exam. [If the minister] asks for my opinion, I will support it. This means those who fail the first time will be allowed to sit in the second exam the ministry is to organise.”

Premier Hun Sen, 11 August 2014, Radio France Internationale

“If 80,000 students don't make it to university, the total revenue forgone is $24,000,000 for the whole higher education industry. So the university owners are likely to do "something" to protect their vested interest.”

Economist Chan Sophal, 12 August 2014, Campro Network

It is fascinating to observe how fast education minister Hang Choun Naron moves to appease the premier who only gives a subtle hint of a Bac II retest. The reaction is swift; within hours, the minister announces the retest within the timeframe to which the premier refers – one to one and half month. Hang Choun Naron goes a step further as if he is making up for his shortcoming: the ministry will provide tutorials free of charge to those who care to resit. It is a case of when Hun Sen whispering, "jump", others respond, "how high?"

Such display of awesome power ought to distress those who are dreaming of building strong government institutions to replace the current autocratic type that they see provides no future for Cambodia. A constant and favourite consolation for them is a romantic notion that changes take time, and that everyone is young enough to wait for a natural demise of the autocracy. The wait may be futile, however. The premier claims without him in charge, the country will then be thrown into another chaos; some say he will make sure of that, and he is capable of that too.

Building a strong institution is a tough game, as the minister finds out the hard way. His effort to prepare for a clean exam after years of cheating is commendable, eventhough he may not have run by the premier for an unwavering approval the idea of doing the right thing. Yet, in any case, the premier could still change his mind; after all he is just a politician, as he puts it, riding on a short boat. He lets the minister spend almost a whole year working on the clean exam only to back down when the reform is real, and its opportunity cost is painfully clear.

There is just too much money at stake. The clean exam would cost Hun Sen’s personal interest group that runs universities about $24 million a year, plus the loss of annual income supplements of a few million dollars for those involved in organising the dirty exams.

Nevertheless, what will the retest be like? Will the promised tutorials that cram a whole year of learning in a one and half month to make any difference? How much value will those who have planned an entire year to cheat put on the tutorials that are free?

It seems the minister is forced to make decisions on the run just to put the smile back to the premier and his personal interest groups: lowering the test standard, and/or a generous marking of the test. This should lift the anticipated pass rate of 30% in this clean exam back to almost 90% the cheats usually achieve.

Anyhow, in this corruption and cheating pit, there is a diamond in the rough. There are those, like the education minister, who are committed to reforms and are more than capable of carrying them through too. They must be allowed to rise to the occasion, soon.

Ung Bun Ang

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(Pseng-Pseng is published on the first, tenth, and twentieth day of every month. Previous issues are archived at pseng-pseng.blogspot.com)

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At Hun Sen's Pleasure

“If you [CNRP] don’t come to attend the session tomorrow, then I will have other jobs to do. If I don’t enter the Assembly…I would like to inform you that getting votes for the CNRP will be difficult.”

Premier Hun Sen, 8 August 2014, The Cambodia Daily

“He does not need to warn us or anything like this, we want the process to proceed smoothly. The 55 lawmakers of the CNRP will attend tomorrow.”

CNRP President Sam Rainsy, 8 August 2014, The Cambodia Daily

“His Excellency Kem Sokha has asked me to vote as a package in the meeting for both deputy president of parliament and heads of commissions. I said that it is impossible. [Sokha] is worried that he will not be elected [as deputy president]. I told him that I guarantee to encourage [CPP] lawmakers to vote for [him], and not to worry.

Premier Hun Sen, 8 August 2014, The Phnom Penh Post

It seems the CNRP stoops so low that it would need a forklift to raise its dignity. The CNRP president is right it is unnecessary for Hun Sen to deliver such warning; the premier ought to know by now that his opponents have already been tamed. However, he must pound them because this is what conquerors do to the conquered to show their power and supremacy.

If the above quote about the CNRP vice president’s cold sweat is accurate, there will be not much of anything the CNRP could bargain with the premier. The CNRP has just handed Hun Sen on a silver platter what he wants – a carte blanche for his pleasure. He will have a final say on what reforms are to go through, which ones are to be stifled through power play in form of protracted negotiations. Will he allow the NEC to do an independent and impartial job, which the CNRP claims to be their main focus? Will he repeat his 1993 mistake and lose elections again? Only more threats and warnings from the premier are certain in due course.

Unless they change their mind later, which is quite possible, the CNRP claim their national interests require them to stay “loyal to their motherland and to respect the people’s desires”. From their strategy manifesto, this means they must solve “border issues, illegal immigration, land grabbing, deforestation, government corruption, insufficient salaries, inflation, poverty, and social injustice”. This is a set of nasties that would put the CNRP in direct collision with Hun Sen, which would imply another bout of tensions is coming up.

Anyhow, Hun Sen must be satified that while the CNRP is excellent at creating tensions, they are also good at diffusing them. They say the year of tensions with parliamentary boycott and demonstrations after the July 2013 elections is just to show off “their strength and determination”. Not until their supporters are bashed and their elected parliamentarians are thrown in jail do they realise they may need more than just strength and determination.

The tension temperature plummets to zero when the CNRP take up their seats in parliament despite their junior members still in jail and others on bail for politically motivated charges. They report for duty in parliament after their conqueror’s warning of consequences for no-show; and their plea for an immediate release of the jailed members win them only a due court process without bail.

Nevertheless, any solutions to the nasties the CNRP say they want are threats to pillars of the Hun Sen regime and power. The question is: will Hun Sen go along with the CNRP solutions? A convenient answer is yes. But the real question is: how far will Hun Sen ever go? Will he entertain anything to the extent that he may lose the next elections? Unlikely.

The national interests – whatever they may mean – that bring the CNRP into Hun Sen’s fold will likely be in line with whatever that interests the premier and his personal interest groups.

Ung Bun Ang

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Hun Sen’s Chicken Way Out

«ជោគជ័យ​ហើយ​ ទៅ​នាំគ្នា​ទះ​ដៃ​បាន​ហើយ ។​»

CPP Prime Minister Hun Sen, 22 July 2014, VOA

“For the election law, we need to take time, it’s not just a couple of days. With the political resolution from the 22nd, we still need to discuss some major problems like the NEC and the new voter list and the autonomous budget of the NEC.”

Sak Setha, CPP delegate in the electoral reform joint working group, 30 July 2014, The Cambodia Daily

“In fact, the swearing-in ceremony can be done at any time, even today, and then we can keep talking about the election reforms and amendments to the law and Constitution at the same time.”

Cheam Yeap, CPP delegate in the electoral reform joint working group, 30 July 2014, The Cambodia Daily

“The two parties didn’t reject my conditions, which means they accept my conditions . . . Maybe I need to make another statement to remind [them of] my conditions again.”

Consensus National Election Committee candidate Pung Chhiv Kek, 31 July 2014, The Phnom Penh Post

“This is the signal of a problem. After [being] a member of parliament for 34 years . . . I would like to say that the constitution stipulates only members of the senate and members of parliament have parliamentary immunity.”

Senior CPP lawmaker Cheam Yeap, 31 July 2014, The Phnom Penh Post

Hun Sen is jubilent in many photos taken after the 22 July agreement. He must plan to laugh all the way to the bank after seemingly securing legitimacy for his regime as long as he wishes. He is right the worst the 22 July agreement could do to him is to let him retain whatever that has kept him in power until now.

But then the CNRP, and a grim Kem Sokha at the time, may wipe the smile off Hun Sen’s face by forcing him to swallow a dose of lemon juice. There are conditions before the CNRP rushing into parliament: among others, the ninth member of a new National Election Committee must be selected with consensus between the two parties.

Now the consensus candidate, Pung Chhiv Kek, imposes her own conditions before accepting the role: the new committee needs immunity; it must be allowed to be independent and autonomous in administration: funding, staff recruitment, and control. This would be a small step of a soft-spoken Pung Chhiv Kek, and a giant step for the Cambodian electoral system.

Would Hun Sen agree to these conditions before the CNRP takes up their seats in the parliament?

Hun Sen seems facing a tough choice: being a premier of a half-empty parliament for as long as he likes, or being a premier endorsed by a full parliament but with so much uncertainly after the next election.

His dream of a legitimate parliament may just become a nightmare for him a few years down the road. If he agreed to the reform conditions, it would be likely that he would lose control over the next election outcomes. However, he may not be too worried about this prospect. The loss in 1993 elections over which he had little control did not stop him from flexing his muscles to force himself into a coalition government. But again, he may not fancy a revisit of the 1993 scenario. Or, he may not be allowed to pull the stunt again.

Hence, the other option with the half parliament looks increasingly attactive. The excuse is perfect – there are no timelines in the 22 July agreement for negotiating and implementing reform details, which means anything can be dragged on to keep the status quo and political deadlock in force.

There are a few indications that Hun Sen may not be so keen with this giant step of electoral reforms. First, he has yet to clearly accept the demands of the ninth member, eventhough he formally approves her appointment before the conditions. Second, CPP delegates in joint working groups begin to speak of research necessity, time consuming, etc… all of which are usually used to justify any delay or a prelude to another crisis. It is well known that the CPP can move in a flash to get anything, no matter how complex, done when it suits them. Otherwise, it would be easier to move the mountain to Mohammed.

Tough choice, but Hun Sen will find a chicken way out.

Ung Bun Ang

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(Pseng-Pseng is published on the first, tenth, and twentieth day of every month. Previous issues are archived at pseng-pseng.blogspot.com)